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Security Information

Official Diary

Thursday, 4 September 1952

1. Matt Baird requested me to chat with [REDACTED] 25X1A5a1 people when they were in Washington, and I undertook to do so.

25X1A9a

2. Checked with [REDACTED] and ascertained that his people had made arrangements with FI to cover the Vienna trade fair.

25X1A9a

3. [REDACTED] of O/CI requested me to help in obtaining a cable from General Clark respecting the truce negotiations. I phoned Colonel Porter, who said he would look into it and later told me that a representative of CIA could come over and look at the cable or cables in question and that dissemination to CIA would be made if the need were confirmed upon inspection. I informed Colonel Porter that I would pass this on to [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] and was later informed that he was taking appropriate action. Mr. Beattie informed me that the material in this cable, on the basis of which dissemination to CIA had been vetoed, was in fact SO information that had been passed on to the Military field. I have requested them to investigate the facts on this and, if they are confirmed, we shall have to talk with Colonel Porter.

4. Attended the IAC meeting.

5. Following the IAC meeting, I spoke to General Partridge and Colonel Porter and requested that they do everything in their power to defer any proposed Anglo-French-US conference to revise MIC 33 until after January 1, which is the scheduled completion date of NIE 65. Neither recalled with any exactitude the facts respecting the prior exercise on this paper and I therefore forwarded to each of them a copy of [REDACTED] memorandum 25X1A9a outlining the facts.

25X1A5a1
25X1A5a1

6. Chatted briefly with [REDACTED] who informed me that he had been chatting with [REDACTED] and had dispatched to me a special delivery, air mail, letter. He asked me to call him when the latter had been received.

25X1A9a

25X1A6c

7. Chatted with [REDACTED] on the reply to [REDACTED] and I deferred final decision.

25X1A5a1

8. Following the regular IAC meeting, General Smith, in executive session, suggested as an excellent topic for [REDACTED] the vulnerabilities of Sino-Soviet relations. In accordance with the suggestion

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Ad/c

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of General Samford, this could be divided into two parts: First, the question of whether there was any vulnerability of the existing Chinese regime to be upset; and, second, assuming the Communist regime cannot be upset, is there any vulnerability in relations between the Russian and Chinese Communist governments. I later chatted with Dr. Millikan and suggested this topic to him. He expressed great interest and we agreed that this would be an excellent topic on which to make available [REDACTED] on a sabbatical basis, one or more CIA qualified analysts. This would minimize the necessity of passing classified information [REDACTED]. Both of us agreed, moreover, that this would be an ideal exercise for [REDACTED] and I undertook to chat with Matt Baird as to the possibility of his being made available.

AD/IC

25X1A9a

25X1X7

9. I also spoke with Dr. Millikan on the possibility that [REDACTED] might undertake a study of Soviet military theory along the lines indicated [REDACTED]. Millikan was interested in this project, also, and indicated that it would be advisable to have the cooperation of the Military Services. I assured him that if our survey indicated that there was a need for such research, we would secure IAC approval for a community project, as we had done respecting the China project.

25X1A5a1

25X1A9a

10. [REDACTED] passed on to me some information respecting the oil situation in Egypt and indicated that [REDACTED] was interesting 25X1A9a himself in this aspect of the problem. He had also passed on to [REDACTED] 25X1A9a the interest which I had previously expressed.

25X1A9a

11. Chatted briefly with [REDACTED] 25X1A9a who is applying for a position. [REDACTED] later informed me that [REDACTED] would not be suitable for his operation, but Amory's people have expressed interest.

25X1A9a

12. Attended a meeting with General Smith, Mr. Byroade of State 25X1A9a and his assistant, Mr. Dulles, [REDACTED] to discuss the situation in Iran. Mr. Byroade indicated the present status of State Department thinking and various operational projects were discussed. During the course of this meeting, Mr. Byroade referred to an Air message [REDACTED]

25X6A

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25X1A9a

might be obtained from Alton Jones and I requested authority to have [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] flown to Rome to interrogate the Jones party. The DCI authorized 25X1A9a to do this, if I felt it necessary, but preferred to have such interrogation done by one of our representatives in Rome. I subsequently talked with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and was satisfied that existing 25X1A9a arrangements will be sufficiently expeditious. [REDACTED] is preparing a questionnaire to explore Jones's views on whether or not any deal can actually be made with Mossadeq and whether he believes that the US/UK cooperation is a stumbling block to a more reasonable agreement. I later saw a cable from 25X1A9a respecting talks with Jones which tended in my mind to confirm my estimate of this situation, and mentioned this to the DCI.

13. Attended a cocktail party given for Mr. Shackelford in Secretary Pace's office and took occasion to question Pace whether his reaction as to Papagos's condition coincided with that of Shackelford's, and he assured me that it did. Pace expressed the view that Papagos had at most one year more. I later mentioned this to the Director.

25X1X7



15. Attended meeting in General McKee's Office, chaired by General Samford, respecting the summary evaluation of US vulnerability to Soviet attack. Admiral Bieri and Colonel Kyes of O/NE also attended, as did Captain Lane of General McKee's office. I was somewhat horrified by the position taken on behalf of the JCS by General McKee, who indicated that they had strictly enjoined the estimators from putting on "a Russian hat" and to pay no attention to intentions. General Samford pointed out very ably that this was wholly inconsistent with the Directive received from the NSC, which had to be read in the light of the Staff paper upon which it was based. I was forced to leave this meeting early and, later, General Samford indicated to me that substantial agreement had been reached on the paper. He and I agreed that under the terms of the Directive the DCI was not bound by the views of those with whom he collaborated in the preparation of this summary evaluation. I also informed General Samford of the willingness of Mr. Lay to call a meeting of the Steering Committee

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of the NSC Senior Staff to consider this paper before it was discussed with General Smith, and he undertook to follow through on this.

16. Prior to lunching with Mr. Lay, discussed with him my plans for the preparation of a Presidential book to be used by the successful Presidential candidate. Mr. Lay is preparing a corresponding compilation dealing with US policy in various areas. We agreed that it might be extremely useful to request Defense and other policy and operational departments to prepare brief summaries or progress reports with respect to the same areas, so that the new President would have a single set of books in which he would find a brief statement of the situation in each area, U.S. policy applicable to the area, and the status of U.S. programs dealing with the area. I undertook to designate five or six countries or areas in which Lay and I could make trial runs and then consider what type of a request would go to the other departments and agencies.

17. Briefed Shef Edwards on the background and facts known to me about the Putnam PSB paper.


LEE